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Abstract
The Agricultural Risk Protection Act greatly increased the expected marginal net
benefit of farmers buying high-coverage crop insurance policies by coupling premium
subsidies to coverage level. This policy change, combined with cross-sectional variations
in expected marginal net benefits of high-coverage policies, is used to estimate the role
that premium subsidies play in farmers’ crop insurance decisions. We use county data for 
corn, soybeans, and wheat to estimate regression equations that are then used to obtain
insight into two policy scenarios. We first estimate that eventual adoption of actuarially
fair incremental premiums, combined with current coupled subsidies, would increase
farmers’ purchase of high-coverage policies by almost 400 percent from 1998 levels
across the three crops and two plans of insurance included in the analysis. We then
estimate that a return to decoupled subsidies would decrease farmers’ high-coverage
purchase decisions by an average of 36 percent.
Keywords: Agricultural Risk Protection Act, crop insurance, premium subsidies.
INFLUENCE OF THE PREMIUM SUBSIDY ON FARMERS’ 
CROP INSURANCE COVERAGE DECISIONS
The Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) of 2000 is the latest in a series of steps
by Congress to increase the proportion of U.S. crop risk that is borne by the crop insur-
ance program. To accomplish this, ARPA set up mechanisms to increase the development
of new crop insurance products and to induce farmers to buy more insurance. The pri-
mary inducement was an end to the rule that largely decoupled crop insurance subsidies
from farmers’ selected coverage levels. Before ARPA, the Risk Management Agency
(RMA) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) kept the dollar amount of pre-
mium subsidies constant for all coverage levels between 65 and 85 percent, with per acre
subsidies dropping for coverage levels below 65 percent. This constant subsidy was
accomplished by making the ratio of subsidy rates at different coverage levels inversely
proportional to the associated premium rates. In other words, crop insurance subsidies
were decoupled from a farmer’s choice of coverage over this range.1
A cursory examination of the data seems to suggest that the overwhelming farmer
response to decoupled subsidies was to minimize the amount they had to spend in order
to obtain the maximum fixed premium subsidy. In 1998, of the 75.6 million acres insured
at a coverage level of at least 65 percent under the government’s Actual Production
History (APH) yield insurance program, only 13.6 percent of acres were insured at a
coverage level greater than 65 percent.
Standard models of decisions under risk imply that risk-averse farmers will purchase
full insurance if their insurance is actuarially fair (expected indemnities equal to pre-
mium). That such a small percentage of farmers purchased more insurance than was
necessary to obtain the maximum per acre subsidy seems to suggest that their primary
motivation for buying insurance was to maximize profits. Using panel data from 1989,
Just, Calvin, and Quiggin (1999) come to this exact conclusion. They write: “Surpris-
ingly, risk aversion appears to be a minor part of the incentive to participate” (p. 847).
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Given the relatively small size of the crop insurance program in 1989, it seems rea-
sonable to ascertain whether the Just, Calvin, and Quiggin conclusions still hold. After
all, the incidence of adverse selection is likely much lower now because participation
rates are so much higher. In 2004, 77 percent of corn acres, 89 percent of cotton acres, 78
percent of soybean acres, and 77 percent of wheat acres were insured. The corresponding
participation rates in 1989 were 42, 32, 34, and 39 percent.
The contributions we make with this paper are as follows. Using both pre- and post-
ARPA county-level data for corn, soybeans, and wheat, we estimate how farmers’ 
coverage level decisions are influenced by the degree to which the incremental cost of
higher coverage levels is subsidized. We use actual average insurance premiums charged
and simulate expected indemnities to calculate the percent subsidy. We test whether the
influence of the subsidy on coverage level decisions varies by crop and insurance plan.
We then use regression equations to predict what coverage levels would be purchased
under two scenarios. The first scenario applies ARPA subsidies to the actuarially fair
incremental costs to estimate where crop insurance coverage levels are likely to settle
once a new set of premium rates are fully implemented by USDA. We compare this set of
estimates to average coverage levels in 2004 for validation of the regression equations.
The second scenario is when per acre subsidies are decoupled from coverage levels and
premiums are set so that the incremental costs of insurance coverage above the 65 percent
level are set at actuarially fair levels. The analysis begins with a presentation of the
incremental benefits and costs of crop insurance.
Incremental Net Benefits of Crop Insurance Coverage
Most U.S. crop farmers choose the amount of insurance to purchase by choosing a
percentage of an estimate of their expected yield for the APH program or expected
revenue for revenue insurance coverage. For most crops, coverage is available in 5
percent increments from 50 to 85 percent. Throughout the 1990s, three to four times as
many acres were insured at the 65 percent level as were insured at higher coverage levels.
Very few acres were insured at less than the 65 percent level until eligibility for commod-
ity program payments was made contingent on participation in the crop insurance
program in 1995. (See, for example, Figure 1 in Babcock, Hart, and Hayes 2004.)
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One of the policy objectives of ARPA was to induce farmers to buy more insurance
coverage in which one measure of “more insurance” is the proportion of acres insured at 
some level greater than 65 percent. This measure is the one that we adopt. Of course, a
more exact measure could be obtained by specifying the proportion of farmers who
purchase at each coverage level. But this would require reporting on the results from a
multinomial choice model that would give little additional insight into the policy issues
addressed here.
The key factor in determining whether a farmer chooses to purchase more than the 65
percent coverage level is whether the benefits of higher coverage exceed the costs of higher
coverage. Of course, costs and benefits will vary according to the exact coverage level
chosen, but given that premium costs and expected insurance indemnities at different
coverage levels are highly correlated, good indicators of incremental costs and benefits for
higher coverage levels are those that occur at a single coverage level. For this analysis, we
select the 75 percent coverage level for our measure of incremental costs and benefits.
For now, we abstract from any risk benefits that crop insurance might provide to a
farmer and focus on expected profits from the program. We hypothesize that if expected
profits at the 75 percent coverage level are greater than expected profits at the 65 percent
coverage level, then a farmer will choose the 75 percent coverage level. Of course, this is
a sufficient condition for any risk-averse farmer to move to 75 percent coverage as well
because we are giving zero weight to any risk benefits from insurance.
Assuming that output prices, expected yields, and production costs are independent
of the insurance coverage level, the change in expected profits is given by the difference
in expected indemnities (I) and producer-paid premiums (PP) at the 75 and 65 percent
coverage levels:
∆π= E(I75)–E(I65)–(PP75 - PP65) =∆I -∆PP. (1)
If premiums are actuarially fair and unsubsidized, then∆π = 0. But premiums are subsi-
dized and Babcock, Hart, and Hayes (2004) demonstrated that even if 65 percent
premiums are actuarially fair, 75 percent premiums are too high for most farmers. Thus
we need to account for both subsidies and actuarial fairness in determining∆π.
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Incremental Costs of Crop Insurance Coverage
To estimate∆PP in equation (1) requires an accounting of the actual subsidies and
premiums charged. ARPA changed the subsidy structure but not the premium structure, so
we need to estimate∆PP both before and after ARPA. Denoting 65 and 75 percent pre-
mium rates (premium divided by liability) as rate65 and rate75, the premium subsidy rates
at 65 and 75 percent as psub65 and psub75, a farmer’s APH yield as Y, and the insurance 
price as p, the change in the producer premium for the APH plan of insurance is
∆PP = (1 - psub75)*rate75*p*0.75*Y - (1 - psub65)*rate65*p*0.65*Y. (2)
Both before and after ARPA, 75 percent premium rates (dollars of premium per dol-
lar of liability) for the APH program for corn, soybeans, and wheat equal the 65 percent
premiums multiplied by the constant 1.538. Therefore,
∆PP = p*Y*rate65*(1.538*0.75*(1- psub75) - 0.65*(1 - psub65)), (3)
which under pre-ARPA conditions equals approximately 0.5*p*Y*rate65. After ARPA,
premium subsidy rates were increased from 41.7 to 59 percent for 65 percent coverage
and from 23.5 to 55 percent for 75 percent coverage. Thus∆PPpost is approximately
0.25*p*Y*rate65, which demonstrates that ARPA cut the incremental cost of moving to
75 percent coverage in half for all U.S. corn, soybean, and wheat farmers.
The ARPA-induced reduction in incremental cost does not imply that all farmers
found that expected profits immediately increased under ARPA when they purchased
higher coverage levels. As pointed out in Babcock, Hart, and Hayes, crop insurance
premium rates increase too rapidly with coverage level in most regions of the country.
For those farmers who faced these high rates, the drop in incremental insurance cost from
ARPA simply meant a closer balance between costs and benefits of higher coverage
levels, not necessarily an increase in expected profits.
Incremental Benefit of Crop Insurance Coverage
To a risk-neutral producer the incremental benefit of crop insurance coverage is the
change in expected indemnities,∆I, that will be received. Clearly∆I will be positive
because for any given loss, the magnitude of the indemnity will grow as coverage in-
creases and the frequency with which a claim will be made will, in general, be greater.
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For actuarially fair premium rates,
∆I = p*Y*(0.75*rate75 - 0.65*rate65). (4)
Coble, et al. (2002), in an unpublished empirical examination of the actuarial fairness of
crop insurance rates, conclude that there is a strongly negative relationship between
actuarially fair 65 percent rates and the ratio of actuarially fair 75 to 65 percent rates.
Babcock, Hart, and Hayes demonstrate that such a negative relationship must exist if
yields are generated by a well-behaved probability distribution. But crop insurance rates
for APH and Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) were, until quite recently, based on constant
rate relativities. That is, the premium rate for 75 percent coverage was set equal to a
constant factor multiplied by the premium rate for 65 percent coverage. Clearly such an
assumption will tend to overestimate∆I in high-risk areas and perhaps underestimate∆I
in low-risk areas.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between simulated∆I, expressed as a percent
change, and 65 percent premium rates. The simulations assume that yields follow a beta
density. The relationship between the change in indemnities and 65 percent base rates
illustrated in Figure 1 is quite robust across alternative functional forms for the yield
distribution. Thus, we employ the Figure 1 relationship to estimate∆I.
Data
What we want to estimate is how farmers’ coverage level purchase decisions are af-
fected by the net benefits from higher coverage. The independent variable in the
relationship is the change in expected profits (expressed as a percentage of the change in
expected indemnities) obtained by moving to 75 percent insurance coverage. The de-
pendent variable will be the number of acres insured at a coverage level greater than 65
percent divided by the number of acres insured at 65 percent or higher coverage levels.
Throughout this paper, we will refer to crop insurance at or above the 65 percent cover-
age level as buy-up insurance.
The number of insured acres at each coverage level for all insurance products is
available from RMA’s Summary of Business Report publications. For this analysis, we
obtained insured acres for corn, soybeans, and wheat for 1998 and 2002. These two years
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FIGURE 1. Increase in expected indemnities from moving to 75 from 65 percent
coverage
were selected for a number of reasons. ARPA was passed in June of 2000. Its subsidy
provisions went into effect immediately, but farmers had already made their decisions
about which coverage level to purchase so there would be little or no impact from ARPA
in 2000. We could have selected crop year 2001 data but experience with crop insurance
provisions suggests that it takes time for the industry to learn about significant changes in
policy. Insurance agents must be notified and trained, quoting software must be adjusted,
and then farmers must be made aware of the impacts of change. Hence, the 2002 data
should more fully reflect awareness of the ARPA policy changes and subsequent changes
in coverage levels.
We could also extend the analysis to 2003 and 2004 crop year data, but then we would
not have a ceteris paribus change in subsidy levels. Beginning with the 2003 crop year,
RMA began to implement a new set of premium rates and surcharges at higher coverage
levels. Thus we would have to account for the confounding effects of these changes.
We chose not to use 1999 data because a special 25 percent premium reduction pro-
gram was implemented late in the crop insurance sign-up period. This program reduced
producer-paid premiums by an additional 25 percent. Undoubtedly some proportion of
agents and their farmer clients were aware of this program, but many were not. Thus,
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assuming that all farmers made their 1999 coverage level decisions with full information
would be incorrect. The 25 percent premium reduction program was also in place in 1998,
but it was announced after farmers had made their crop insurance decisions. Thus, we can
assume that 1998 decisions reflect their prior knowledge about premium and subsidy rates.
Table 1 provides a summary of the acreage data for the two crop insurance programs
with premium rates that were based on constant rate relativities in 1998 and 2002. As is
readily apparent, the proportion of acres insured above 65 percent under the APH plan of
insurance relative to all acres insured with buy-up insurance increased dramatically over
this period. Of course, one would expect this type of response because of the 50 percent
drop in the cost of incremental coverage. Also apparent is that there was a dramatic shift
in acreage to CRC between 1998 and 2002. Part of this switch occurred because CRC
was more widely known and available in 2002 than in 1998. But part of the reason is
likely due to the change in CRC subsidies because of ARPA.
Before ARPA, CRC premium subsidies were limited to the per acre amounts available
under APH. After ARPA, the same subsidy rates were applied to the full CRC premium.
Because CRC premiums are proportionate to the 65 percent premium rates for APH and
TABLE 1. Share of acres insured at different coverage levels
APH CRC
1998 2002 1998 2002
Corn
< 65% 18,315,168 10,023,815 606,167 1,299,162
65% 16,968,857 4,743,560 7,359,291 4,308,534
> 65% 3,236,315 4,147,485 2,784,919 15,707,193
Share > 65%* 16% 47% 27% 78%
Soybeans
< 65% 19,196,259 12,894,083 512,576 493,708
65% 13,139,644 6,731,213 6,361,680 1,787,981
> 65% 2,633,019 15,036,483 2,223,009 7,757,582
Share > 65%* 17% 69% 26% 81%
Wheat
< 65% 16,080,981 6,489,865 396,641 1,353,613
65% 21,398,984 5,368,095 4,210,962 5,456,146
> 65% 1,917,366 4,592,073 310,259 11,859,205
Share > 65%* 8% 46% 7% 68%
Source: Summary of Business Report from RMA: http://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/sob/.
*Acreage at greater than 65% divided by acreage at or greater than 65%.
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because CRC uses the same APH rate relativities, ARPA decreased the incremental cost of
moving from 65 to 75 percent CRC coverage by the same 50 percent proportion as the
decline in APH. However, because CRC premiums are greater than APH premiums, the per
acre amount of subsidy available under CRC is now greater. This increased amount of
subsidy may explain part of the large movement of business toward CRC.
The summary statistics in Table 1 suggest that we are likely to find that the decline
in the incremental cost in moving to higher coverage levels due to ARPA resulted in an
increase in the proportion of acres insured at higher coverage levels under APH and
CRC. However, we do not rely solely on the change in subsidies under ARPA to estimate
how coverage level decisions are affected by expected profits. We also exploit the
tremendous cross-section variation in expected profits from higher coverage levels.
As shown in Figure 1, the percent change in expected indemnities as one moves from
65 to 75 percent coverage depends on the degree of risk, as represented by the 65 percent
premium (expected indemnity). But the percent change in the premium charged for 75
percent coverage under APH and CRC is a constant, as can be easily verified by the
expressions for∆PPpre and∆PPpost given earlier. This means that the percent change in
expected profits obtained from 75 percent coverage is greatest for low-risk farmers and is
lowest for high-risk farmers.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the tremendous variation in riskiness of corn and soybean
production in the United States. Wheat shows a similar range. Therefore, we have the
ability to use cross-sectional variation as well as two years of time variation in expected
profits to estimate the role that the pursuit of expected profits plays in determining
coverage levels.
As previously discussed, our estimates of the change in expected profits depend on
knowledge of the degree of yield risk. With both APH and CRC in 1998 and 2002,
increases in yield risk result in proportionately lower benefits and proportionately con-
stant costs. Thus, the proportionate change in expected profits from moving to 75 percent
coverage is inversely related to yield risk.
Clearly there exists variation in yield risk among fields and among farmers within a
county. One could use observations on individual farmer decisions about coverage level,
modeling it as a 0-1 decision depending on whether a farmer purchased 65 percent
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0.02 - 0.04
0.04 - 0.06
0.06 - 0.10
0.10 - 0.15
> 0.15
FIGURE 2. APH premium rates of 65 percent for corn for the 2002 crop year
0.02 - 0.04
0.04 - 0.06
0.06 - 0.10
0.10 - 0.15
> 0.15
FIGURE 3. APH premium rates of 65 percent for soybeans for the 2002 crop year
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coverage or higher coverage. Such an analysis would be complicated by the sheer number
of insured farmers. Reducing the number of observations would require a sampling
procedure that would result in an adequate data set.
An alternative is to rely on the extensive variation in yield risk across counties, as
shown in Figures 2 and 3, and to aggregate individual farmer decisions into a county
decision variable. This more aggregate approach models how county average changes in
expected profits from higher crop insurance coverage levels influence the average
coverage decision in a county. The following procedure was used to estimate the average
change in expected yield profits at the county level.
RMA reports total premium and total liability by county, crop, and coverage level.
Thus, for each coverage level we can measure the average premium rate for the county by
dividing total premium by liability. Our goal is to measure the average yield risk of
farmers in a county who purchase coverage of at least 65 percent. We will measure the
amount of yield risk by the average 65 percent premium rate charged to those farmers in
the county. The data in Table 1 show that a significant amount of acreage is insured at
coverage levels greater than 65 percent, so we do not want to restrict our measure to only
those who insured at 65 percent. The procedure that we used to measure the average 65
percent rate for those producers who purchased at least 65 percent coverage is best
explained with an example.
Table 2 presents 2002 corn data for Cass County, Illinois, for APH. At each coverage
level, the average rate is calculated by dividing total premium by total liability. The
average rate at each coverage level is then converted to the corresponding average 65
percent rate by dividing it by the appropriate rate relativity factor. These rate relativity
TABLE 2. Data for Cass County used to calculate average 65 percent premium rates
Coverage
Level
(%)
Insurance
Plan
Insured
Acres
(acres)
Total
Liability
($)
Total
Premium
($)
Average
Rate
Average
65% Rate
65 APH 2,446 456,555 28,563 0.0626 0.0626
70 APH 113 21,138 1,269 0.0600 0.0494
75 APH 341 75,912 4,590 0.0605 0.0393
80 APH 36 8,525 651 0.0764 0.0391
85 APH 0 0 0 na na
Source: Summary of Business Report from RMA: http://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/sob/.
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factors are 1.0 for 65 percent coverage, 1.215 for 70 percent coverage, 1.538 for 75
percent coverage, 1.954 for 80 percent coverage, and 2.462 for 85 percent coverage. The
result of this multiplication is reported in the last column in Table 2. The average 65
percent rate is then calculated by talking the acreage-weighted average of the results in
the last column. In this example, the average rate is 0.0591. This is a bit higher than the
0.052 rate that would be charged a farmer in Cass County in 2002 if the farmer had an
APH yield equal to the reference yield of 120 bu/ac.
Given this estimate of the average rate, we can estimate the average expected gain
from moving to 75 percent coverage. Using the beta distribution that generated the rates
in Table 4 in Babcock, Hart, and Hayes (2004), the actuarially fair 75 percent premium
rate is 0.0825.2 Then, using the earlier expressions for∆I and∆PPpost, we have∆I =
0.02346*p*Y and∆PPpost = 0.014927*p*Y. Thus, the change in expected profits is
0.008533*p*Y. We normalize this change in expected profits by dividing through by our
estimate of∆I. The result then represents the change in expected profits as a percent
subsidy. In this example, the result is 0.36, or in other words, the change in expected
profit amounts to a 36 percent subsidy.
Before moving to a discussion of how we estimate the change in expected profit for
CRC, it is instructive to calculate the percent subsidy for Cass County before ARPA.
Assuming that the average 65 percent premium rate in 1998 was 0.0591, the change in
expected profit is -0.006296*p*Y, which translates into a -27 percent subsidy. That is,
Cass County farmers were being asked to pay 27 percent more than the actuarially fair
incremental cost for 75 percent coverage in 1998. This switch from a 27 percent tax to a
36 percent subsidy creates a large incentive for the average farmer in Cass County to
switch coverage levels.
Calculating the change in expected profits from higher coverage levels with CRC is
more difficult than with APH because the CRC rating structure contains three separate
components (yield risk, revenue risk, and price risk) and a portion of the change in
expected indemnities is due to price variability. However, examination of the relationship
between 65 percent APH base premium rates and CRC premium rates at the 65, 75, and
85 percent coverage levels reveals an exact linear relationship, which is shown in Figure
4. Thus we can use the average premium rates for CRC at different coverage levels to
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FIGURE 4. Predicting CRC premium rates with 65 percent APH premium rates
reveal the average underlying 65 percent APH premium. This underlying 65 percent APH
premium rate can then be used to calculate∆PPpre and∆PPpost. What remains is how to
calculate∆I for CRC.
Because CRC premiums use the same constant rate relativities that are used to rate
APH, we know that they cannot be used to calculate∆I. What is needed is an independent
measure of∆I that is based on a revenue distribution, much like we used to calculate ∆I 
for APH.
The rating equations for Revenue Assurance can be used to estimate∆I for CRC
coverage. The coverage provided by Revenue Assurance with the harvest price option is
nearly identical to CRC, and the current rating equations are based on Monte Carlo
integration of revenue draws as discussed in Babcock and Hennessy 1996. The rating
equations were estimated by regressing the results of many Monte Carlo simulations on
the level of rating variables that vary across the simulations. The rating variables included
are price volatility, APH premium rate, APH yield divided by a county’s reference yield, 
and coverage level. A quadratic functional form is used. Separate rating equations were
estimated for different assumed levels of price-yield correlation. But because negative
Influence of the Premium Subsidy on Farmers’ Crop Insurance Coverage Decisions / 13
correlation does not significantly affect∆I for CRC, we take the Revenue Assurance
rating equation used for Iowa for corn and use it for all states and crops. Table 3 provides
the rating equation coefficients.
This regression equation is used to estimate the change in expected indemnities un-
der CRC using the equation∆I = p*Y*(0.75*rate75 - 0.65*rate65) where rate75 and
rate65 denote premium rates using the Revenue Assurance rating equation. Given these
pieces of information, we constructed the average by which higher coverage was subsi-
dized by county for corn, soybeans, and wheat for the 1998 and 2002 crop years.
Table 4 presents the average percent subsidy by crop and year for the sample. Before
ARPA, the incremental cost of higher coverage was substantially more than the incre-
mental benefit. That is, farmers received a negative subsidy for increased coverage. This
negative subsidy results from per acre premium subsidies being decoupled with respect to
coverage level combined with the fixed rate relativity factor. The coupled subsidies under
ARPA dramatically lowered the incremental cost of increased coverage, resulting in
almost actuarially fair incremental CRC incremental premiums and a net average positive
subsidy for producers who purchased higher coverage levels of APH insurance in 2002.
Of course, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, there is tremendous cross-sectional variation
TABLE 3. Revenue Assurance rating equation used to estimate expected indemnities
Variable Coefficient
Intercept -0.096525
APH 65% rate 1.393955
APH 65% rate2 -0.653385
Coverage -0.052425
Coverage2 0.273246
Yield ratio 0.074885
Yield ratio2 0.001167
Price volatility -0.312273
Price volatility2 0.269246
Coverage x APH 65% rate -0.226561
Yield ratio x APH 65% rate 0.043532
Price volatility x APH 65% rate 0.503837
Coverage x yield ratio -0.110972
Coverage x price volatility 0.515275
Price volatility x yield ratio -0.032282
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TABLE 4. Average percent subsidy by crop, insurance plan, and year (%)
1998 (Pre-ARPA) 2002 (Post-ARPA)
Crop CRC APH CRC APH
Wheat -85 -72 -7 16
Corn -61 -66 -1 17
Soybeans -84 -63 -11 18
in the net subsidy received for buying higher coverage levels, with those farmers in low-
rate counties receiving dramatically higher percent subsidies than those in high-rate
counties. We next show how we combine this cross-sectional variability with the vari-
ability in subsidies brought about by ARPA.
The Model
Under our premise, insurance participation at coverage levels above 65 percent is
driven by the percent subsidy producers receive in changing from 65 percent coverage to
a higher level of coverage. For our dependent variable, we have chosen the proportion of
buy-up insured acres with coverage levels above 65 percent. This ratio is limited to be
between 0 and 1. Given this censored data, traditional regression analysis would not be
appropriate. The statistical technique used in the analysis should account for this censor-
ing. We have chosen to use a two-limit Tobit procedure for this work. This technique will
account for the censoring at both ends of the (0, 1) interval and maintain predictions
within the interval.
The model equation is given by
Yt = Xt*β + ut if 0 < Xt*β + ut < 1
= 0 if Xt*β + ut ≤ 0 (5)
= 1 if Xt*β + ut ≥ 1 for t = 1, 2, …, T
where Yt is the proportion of buy-up insured acres with coverage levels above 65 percent,
Xt is a vector of independent variables, β is a vector of coeficients, and ut is an error
term. The errors are assumed to be independently distributed with a zero mean and a
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constant variance of σ2. After examining scatter plots of the data, we decided to utilize a
linear and quadratic term for the percent subsidy as part of the vector of independent
variables. Given the combination of crops and insurance plans we are examining, we
tested whether the regression parameters varied by insurance plan or by crop. Table 5
contains the likelihood ratio test results comparing these various combinations. The
likelihood ratio test compares the log-likelihoods of competing models. The test statistic
folows a χ2 distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the
number of regressors in the model. In all cases, the results from the pooled estimates are
rejected. Thus, we estimated independent equations by crop and insurance plan.
Given the results in Table 5, separate regressions are run for each crop-insurance
plan combination. The regression equation is
(Proportion of Buy-Up Insured Acres with Coverage above 65 percent)t (6)
=β0 +β1*(Percent Subsidy)t +β2*(Percent Subsidy2)t + ut.
The results from the separate regressions are given in Table 6. Only the quadratic terms
in the wheat-APH equations are not statistically significant; all other estimates are
significant at the 1 percent level. In all cases, the percent subsidy has an increasingly
positive impact on the proportion of buy-up insurance beyond 65 percent coverage.
Model Prediction
Given the structure of the model, the prediction mechanism must account for the
censoring of the data at zero and one. Following Greene (1990, p. 738), predicted values
from a two-limit Tobit model can be computed as
Ŷ = U + L*Φ(zL)– U*Φ(zU) +[Φ(zU)– Φ(zL)]*X*β + σ*[φ(zL)– φ(zU)] (7)
TABLE 5. Likelihood ratio tests
Model Log-Likelihood
Number of
Regressors
Test
Value
Degrees of
Freedom Probability
No Pooling -10,512 18
Pooling by:
Insurance Plan -11,995 9 2,966 9 0.00
Crop -10,766 6 508 12 0.00
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TABLE 6. Tobit regression estimates
Crop Ins. Plan β0 β1 β2 σ
Wheat CRC 0.6530 0.9349 0.0774 0.5306
(0.0146) (0.0334) (0.0058) (0.0121)
Wheat APH 0.2637 0.4172 0.0207 0.4363
(0.0093) (0.0228) (0.0191) (0.0176)
Corn CRC 0.5953 1.0650 0.2302 0.3677
(0.0082) (0.0286) (0.0200) (0.0064)
Corn APH 0.2108 0.5942 0.1676 0.3572
(0.0070) (0.0174) (0.0141) (0.0056)
Soybeans CRC 0.7256 0.9188 0.1946 0.3673
(0.0102) (0.0270) (0.0138) (0.0069)
Soybeans APH 0.2862 0.6796 0.2087 0.3107
(0.0065) (0.0156) (0.0122) (0.0050)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates.
whereŶ is the predicted value, U is the upper censoring point, L is the lower censoring 
point, Φ(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, zL = σ-1*(L– X*β),
zU = σ-1*(U– X*β), and φ(.) is the standard normal probability density function. Table 7
contains the average predicted values for the proportion of buy-up insurance coverage
above the 65 percent coverage level and the actual values. The model predictions are
fairly consistent with the actual results. There can be little doubt that the increased
premium subsidies under ARPA helped push producers to choose higher level of insur-
ance coverage.
TABLE 7. Predicted versus actual values
Predicted Actual
Crop
Insurance
Plan
Pre-ARPA
(1998)
ARPA
(2002)
Pre-ARPA
(1998)
ARPA
(2002)
----------------------------------(%)-----------------------------------
Wheat CRC 21.63 56.47 15.85 60.07
Wheat APH 18.06 38.10 16.50 36.84
Corn CRC 20.87 58.08 17.82 62.53
Corn APH 12.75 36.82 9.00 38.54
Soybean CRC 23.90 61.48 20.49 66.91
Soybean APH 15.41 44.84 9.93 49.66
Note: Values are simple averages across all counties for which crop insurance data is reported.
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To explore the effects of ARPA further, Figures 5 and 6 show how the predicted per-
cent buy-up varies with the percent subsidy for APH and CRC, respectively. Immediately
one can see why the hypothesis of constant regression parameters across insurance plans
was rejected. For a given percent subsidy, farmers who purchase CRC have a much
greater incidence of buying higher coverage levels. For example, a 20 percent subsidy
induces approximately 70 percent of CRC acreage to be insured at a coverage level
greater than 65 percent but only 35 percent of APH acreage. One explanation for this
difference may be that farmers who select CRC are more interested in insuring against
price movements. The likelihood that a price movement will trigger an indemnity at the
65 percent coverage level is much lower than the likelihood that farm yields will drop by
35 percent. Also, Figure 4 and 5 show that although we reject constant parameters across
crops, there is a great deal of similarity to how the coverage level increases with subsidies
across the three crops. As shown, increasing the subsidy from -20 percent to 20 percent
increases the percent buy-up from approximately 23 percent to 40 percent for the three
crops under APH and from 48 percent to 76 percent for CRC.
We now want to use these regression equations to predict what would happen to the
percent buy-up under two scenarios, both involving premium rates that better reflect the
incremental indemnities that would occur at higher coverage levels. In the first scenario,
producers face actuarially fair underlying premium rates that better reflect incremental
costs but still enjoy ARPA-style premium subsidies. This scenario is what the RMA is
currently striving to achieve through annual premium rate adjustments. In the second
scenario, producers face the correct incremental costs, but they receive no marginal
premium subsidies, as would be the case under no subsidies or a lump-sum subsidy.
Table 8 contains the predictions under the two scenarios, along with the actual values
for the 2004 crop year. Under the first scenario, most counties would receive an increase
in subsidies relative to their 2002 levels because the 2002 incremental premium rates are
greater than actuarially fair levels. The regression model predicts that corn CRC buy-up
would increase from the actual 62 percent level (see Table 7) to 90 percent. Soybean buy-
up under CRC would increase from 67 percent to 92 percent, and wheat CRC would
increase from 60 percent to 83 percent. For APH, we predict that corn would increase
from its actual 2002 level of 37 percent to 53 percent, soybeans would move from
18 / Babcock and Hart
FIGURE 5. Predicted percent buy-up for APH
FIGURE 6. Predicted percent buy-up for CRC
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TABLE 8. Predicted values from scenarios and 2004 actual values
Predicted
Crop
Insurance
Plan
Correct Rates,
ARPA Subsidies
Correct Rates,
No Subsidies
Actual
2004
------------------------------%----------------------------
Wheat CRC 82.89 59.90 69.04
Wheat APH 47.14 32.85 47.82
Corn CRC 90.30 57.82 84.81
Corn APH 51.94 27.03 52.90
Soybean CRC 91.96 68.05 82.21
Soybean APH 62.98 31.51 55.75
Note: Values are simple averages across all counties for which crop insurance data is reported.
50 percent to 63 percent, and wheat would move from 60 percent to 69 percent. As
Congress and the RMA look to spur continued use of insurance at higher coverage levels,
these results suggest that the premium rate adjustments that RMA is currently implement-
ing may be a productive place to start. The effects of these changes made in 2003 and
2004 are reflected in the 2004 results in Table 8. As shown, percent buy-up in 2004 is
greater than the level in 2002 for both CRC and APH for all crops.
The second scenario removes the marginal premium subsidies. Under this scenario,
the profit-maximizing reason for increasing coverage level is removed, as the incremental
percent subsidy is zero. Risk-averse producers would still purchase higher coverage
levels, whereas risk-neutral producers would be indifferent. The results show that the
predicted proportion of buy-up insurance acres with coverage above 65 percent would
fall dramatically below 2004 actual levels. Approximately 60 percent of CRC acres
would be insured at greater than 65 percent and only 30 percent of acres insured under
APH would be insured at levels above 65 percent. This suggests that the profit-
maximizing reason for purchasing crop insurance is rather strong, possibly driving up to
nearly half of the participation at the higher coverage levels.
Policy Implications and Conclusions
The results of this analysis suggest that by subsidizing higher coverage levels, Con-
gress was successful in achieving its policy objectives of inducing farmers to buy crop
insurance coverage at greater than the 65 percent coverage level. The acres of corn,
soybeans, and wheat insured at more than 65 percent coverage relative to acres insured at
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65 percent and greater coverage levels more than doubled because of ARPA. As we
show, the primary effect of the increased premium subsidies was to neutralize the large
disincentive that producers in most counties faced when choosing whether to buy higher
coverage levels. This disincentive was that the incremental cost of the additional cover-
age far exceeded the incremental benefits. The ARPA subsidies more closely balanced
incremental costs and subsidies in most counties and farmers responded accordingly.
One could argue that Congress needed to pass the subsidies to correct this disincen-
tive. But RMA is currently correcting this disincentive through adjustments in its rating
procedures. We estimate that insurance buy-up will increase substantially over 2004
levels once RMA fully implements its adjustments if the ARPA subsidies are left in
place. Of course, one justification for the ARPA subsidies will disappear after the rate
adjustments are done. We estimate that buy-up acreage would decrease significantly if
Congress moved back to decoupled subsidies.
Endnotes
1. It would not be accurate to claim that the entire crop insurance program was decoup-
led because farmers had to participate in the program and they had to buy at least 65
percent coverage to obtain the fixed amount of premium subsidy.
2. This 75 percent premium rate is a reasonable estimate of an actuarially fair rate
if the 65 percent premium rate is actuarially fair and if marginal moral hazard is
insignificant.
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